

FROM
THE LIBRARY
OF
SIR WILLIAM OSLER, BART.
OXFORD

arms in similar style below, which might be described as gyronny of 4 arg. & az.; small initials in blue. 8vo., blue morocco gilt, back and borders, silk doublures, g. e., by P. Bozerian jeune. £22. XV

- * The catchwords are each surrounded by a pen border of fanciful design. The medallion of Cicero, though slightly chipped, is interesting: the head seen in profile is turning to its left: short brown hair: clean shaven: toga of crimson heightened with gold: blue background partly covered with gold tracery: broad black border with "Marcus Tullius Cicero Orator" in perfectly formed gold capitals: the rest of the page is blank. This head, which may truly be called a portrait, undoubtedly was copied from the antique, probably from a very early MS.

- 65 CICERO'S Cato Major: or a Discourse upon Old Age, translated into English and humbly addrest to the Honoured Mrs. Clayton, 1730. Neatly and boldly written MS., ruled with red lines, title in red and black (135 pp.) Large 8vo., original English red morocco, gilt borders, g. e. £3 3s. 1730

- * This is in similar style to No. 66, but appears to be a transcript made two years after the death of the translator, John Freind. Both works seem to be unpublished.

- 66 CICERO'S Laelius: or a Discourse upon Friendship, humbly inscrib'd to the honoured Mrs. Clayton. Ruled in red, title in red and black (100 pp.) Cr. 4to., original English red morocco, gilt borders, g. e. £4 4s. (c. 1725)

- * This appears to be the autograph MS. of the translator, John Freind (1675-1728), distinguished physician and classical scholar: one of the writers of the "Examination of Bentley's Dissert. on Epistles of Phalaris." See D.N.B. and Allibone. Mrs. Clayton, to whom the work is dedicated, appears to have been Charlotte, Lady Sundon (died 1742): bedchamber woman to Queen Caroline. She "controlled court patronage" to which Freind distantly refers in his dedication.

- 67 CICERO (M. T.), De Somnio Scipionis: De Fato: De Universalitate: Rhetorica. (2) CICERO (Q.), De Petitione Consulatus ad M. T. Ciceronem suum fratrem. (3) HYGINUS. Poeticon Astronomicon. (4) PHALARIS. Francisci Aretini in Phalaridis epistolas e greco sermone latinam in linguam translatas. (5) ÆNEAS SYLVIVS (Pius II. papa), Epistola sub illustr. Hanibalis Nummidie ducis titulo confecta [and other pieces]. Neatly written MSS. on 215 leaves of stout paper (7¼ by 5½ in.), in 2 or 3 hands (15th cent.), 23 long lines to a page, gothic letter, red and black, diagram of a Sphere in the Hyginus, large margins, sound condition. Sm. 4to., old sound russia gilt, lettered contents, g. e. £7 7s. (written c. 1487)

- * Belonged in 1825 to Henry Drury of Harrow.

MSS. of Hyginus are rare; the verses by J. Sentinus attached are dated 1487 in the above: it may be noted that there is no printed ed. between 1485 & 1488. The Phalaris is interesting as a literary forgery, which occasioned the famous Bentley-Boyle controversy.

- 68 CICERO (M. T.), Tusculanæ Quæstiones. MS. of the 15th cent., finely written in roman letter, 24 long lines to a page, by an Italian scribe, on 128 leaves of thin white vellum (8 by 5½ in.) with seven initials illuminated in gold and colours, the first one with white vine decoration in margin. Sm. 4to., green morocco extra gilt, broad inside borders, joints, g. e. £15. XV

- * Broad margins with early MS. notes.

- 69 **CICERO** (M. T.), *Rhetorica ad Herennium*. MS. of the 15th cent., by an Italian scribe, in long italic letter, 25 long lines to a page, on 94 leaves of paper, $9\frac{1}{4}$ by $5\frac{1}{2}$ in., capitals in crimson, with curious initial letter of interlaced strapwork in yellow and brown on a purple ground: marginal notes in Greek. Long 8vo. calf. £5. XV

- 70 **CINGULO** (Gentile de). *Donatellus sive Flores Grammaticae editi a Maistro Gentili de Panicali de Cingulo, sub anno 1445*. MS. on paper, 136 leaves, $8\frac{3}{4}$ by $5\frac{1}{2}$ in., well written, large capitals in red with pen ornamentation, that on page 1 large with a grotesque animal. Sm. 4to., calf, blind stamped. £4 10s. XV

* This appears to be the original autograph manuscript, and ends as follows:—"Donatellus iste nō nō inceptus fuit in millesimo CCCCLV^o et die decima prima mensis Martii in ora vespertina et necnon completus fuit in MCCCCXLV^o die tertia mensis Maii in hora meredicy. Amen P.S.N." Chevalier records two persons of the name of Gentile de Cingoli, one a professor of philosophy XIII cent., the other a Franciscan XIV cent.

- 71 [**COLONNA**]. **ÆGIDIUS** Romanus. *Tractatus de Gradibus Formarum*. Finely written in broad semi-gothic letter, in red and black, double columns of 50 lines, by an Italian (?) scribe, on 30 leaves of vellum, $11\frac{1}{2}$ by $8\frac{3}{4}$ in., interleaved with paper for notes. Fol., old French blue leather gilt, £4 10s. XIV

* Lettered on the side in characteristic manner with title and the name of (A. A. Monteil, French historian 1769-1850. His MSS. were sold in 1836. For another example from this library see **GREGORIUS**.

Ægidius Colonna, 1247-1316, was preceptor of Philippe-le-Bel; abp. of Bourges in 1295.

- 72 **COLONNA** (Guido de). *Historia Destructionis Trojae*. Written in rounded gothic letters, by an English scribe, double columns of 36 lines, on 108 leaves of vellum, $9\frac{1}{2}$ by 7 in.: first page with painted initial in red and blue with decoration extending the length of page: numerous smaller letters with flourishes and scrolls: chapter headings in red. Sm. fol., calf. £12. XIV-XV

* The name of the author occurs in the terminal chapter together with the date of composition, 1287.

On one of the fly-leaves is a poem on Drunkenness, in a XVth century hand. Early signatures are Homfrédus Taylor, Atwoode, Robartus Nebbris, Edward Conway (twice on last page). The last signature is in a large sloping hand, very bold: temp. James I. It is probably that of the first Viscount Conway (d. 1631), secretary of state, governor of the Isle of Wight, &c. Numerous marginal notes in an early hand (XVth).

- 73 **CONRADUS** de Susato. *Quæstiones in primos quinque libros Ethicorum Aristotelis, Conradi de Susato, Doctoris S. Theologiae, Episcopi Ratisponensis*. MS. of the 15th cent., written in double columns, on 335 leaves of paper, $11\frac{1}{4}$ by $8\frac{1}{4}$ in. Fol., bound in the original oak boards covered with pigskin, with square stamp of two grotesque birds many times repeated, roses, fleurs-de-lis, &c. the frame stamped many times with a small panel "deo * laus" brass clasp. £7 7s. written 1455

* The work ends "Anno Domini 1455 sexta die mensis Octobris finiti sunt quinque libri Ethicorum Aristotelis in alma Universitate Heydelbergensi per me Johannem Stopper alias Borner de Budingen, Maguntino Diocesi." Fabricius

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
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John Freind Celebrated Physician

J. Freind

66 CICERO'S Laelius: or a Discourse upon Friendship, humbly inscrib'd to the honoured Mrs. Clayton. Ruled in red, title in red and black (100 pp.) Cr. 4to., original English red morocco, gilt borders, g. e. £4 4s. (c. 1725)

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FREIND (JOHN) 1675-1728.

7561. In English, on paper: written by John Freind (?) about 1727: $8\frac{1}{2} \times 6\frac{1}{4}$ in., xviii + 114 pages: in contemporary red morocco binding with gilt edges.

'Cicero's Lælius: or a Discourse upon Friendship. humbly inscrib'd to the Honored Mrs Clayton.', with dedicatory epistle signed by the translator, John Freind. The title is in red and black, and the pages are ruled in red. A few pages at the beginning, and pp. 101-12 are blank.

Formerly in the possession of James T. Gibson Craig and (?) of Mrs. Ainslie, Parkside, Dorking. Bt. from J. and J. Leighton, 24 Oct., 1912 (lot 66 in their catalogue issued about that time). The same catalogue contains (lot 65) a transcript of a translation by Freind of 'Cicero's Cato Major', also inscribed to Mrs. Clayton, dated 1730 (i.e. two years after Freind's death), in similar style to the above. These two works, together with another volume, seem to have been lot 1264 in Sotheby's sale of the 2nd portion of the Gibson Craig library in 1888. They were then sold to Wm. Ridler for 9s.

Freind was appointed physician to Queen Caroline in 1727. Charlotte Clayton, afterwards Lady Sundon, was bedchamber woman to Queen Caroline and had considerable influence at court—influence which, according to Freind's dedication, had been exerted in his favour.

CICERO'S

LÆLIUS :

or a Discourse
upon

FRIENDSHIP.

humbly
Inscrib'd to
THE HONORED

M^{rs} CLAYTON.


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CICERO
OF A DISCOURSE
UPON
THE HONORED
PRINCIPLE

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V.
Honrd Mad^{ms},

I have received so many obligations from you, that however incapable I am of making such returns as they deserve, yet I have been uneasy till I could find some occasion of expressing my acknowledgments for them: & I thought I could not do this in a way more agreeable to you, than by laying before you some little fruits of those studies, which you have by so many kind methods encourg'd me to pursue.



I knew I could produce nothing of my own worth your perusal; & when I had resolved upon some translation, I was not at a loss where to make my choice.

Cicero's discourse upon Friendship immediately offer'd itself to me, as the most proper present of this kind I could make to one, whose Friendship to my Dear Father has been so conspicuous. This Treatise has been look'd upon by many, not as a pleasing piece of Speculation, & like Plato's Ideal Republic, too fine ever to be reduc'd into Practice: But you, Had^m, have shewn it to be practicable. You will find nothing here



that is new to you; no kind offices
that you have not fulfilled; nay
that you have not exceeded, by carrying
them on to another generation, & (as there
experienced) by making them hereditary.

It is your Goodness, Mad^m,
that has brought me forward into
Life, beyond what I could otherwise have
preluded to: It is your uncommon concern,
& zeal for my doing well, that has intro-
-duced me to the Royal Presence, & laid
in a foundation of favour towards me,
if I am not wanting to myself. I resolve
to use my utmost endeavours, that these
advantages may not be thrown away
upon me; & I shall do this with the
greater pleasure, since, I know, I can by



no other means so highly oblige you, to
whom I am bound to show all respect
& duty, and shall endeavour always to
approve myself,

Y^r H^{ch} M^{ty},

Y^r most obliged & obedient

Humble Servant,

John Friend







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of

Tully's Discourse
upon
FRIENDSHIP.
addressed to
Titus Pomponius Atticus.

The Preface.

Quintus, flucius Scarola y Augurn as
often a telling pleasant sayings that he re-
-membred of Caius Laelius his father
in law. but never spoke of him without
the Distinction of Laelius y Wise. I
was so recommended to the care & tuition
of Scarola by my father, when I was grown

up a youth, that I never if I could help
 it, & he was not otherwise employ'd, depar-
 ted from the good old man's side. By which
 means I kept in my memory many of his
 wise discourses, many of his short ingenious
 & useful sayings: & study'd always to grow wiser
 by his instruction. After he dyed, I took my
 self to Carlo Pontifex: than whom
 I may venture to say there was not a man
 in Rome more esteem'd both for his parts
 & justice. But of him I will speak in another
 place: now I will return to the Augur.
 Among other things I remember that once
 as he was sitting at home in his Semi-Circle
 when there was only 1 or 2 or 3 of his familiar
 Friends present, he happen'd to discourse
 upon an affair, which was then the common
 Subject of conversation. You may remember
Attellus, & the more, because you & Sulpicius
 were well acquainted, how everyone
 wonder'd or complain'd when he was Tri-
 bune of the Commons, that there was

such a mortal hatred between him and
 Quintus Pompeius the Consul
 with whom he had lived in the utmost
 familiarity & strictest friendship. Scæ-
 =vola I say when this matter happened
 to be mentioned, gave us an account of a
 Discourse concerning friendship which
 Lælius held with him, & his Son in law
 Caius Fannius, Marcus' Son.
 a few days after the Death of Scipio
 Africanus. I remember the heads:
 which I have put together in mine own
 method, & introduced them speaking them-
 =selves in the following dialogue. Lælius says
 I & says he should be too often repeated:
 & that it should seem as if it came from
 their own mouths. For since in our conver-
 =sation you have often required of me, to
 write something on friendship, which I

I thought worthy of every one's knowledge, &
 agreeable to the intimate acquaintance betw
 -en us: Therefore I underlook it very willing
 -ly with a prospect of doing some Publick good
 & obliging you at the same time. But, as in
 my *Cato Major*, which I writ to you concern
 -ing old age, I introduced old *Cato* speak
 -ing; not knowing any person better qualified to
 speak upon that subject, than he, who enjoy'd so
 long a life, & had above others been, so much honou
 -red in his old age: So since we have heard by Tra
 -dition, that there was a great friendship between
Laelius & *Scipio*, I thought *Laelius* the
 fittest person, to explain the notions of friend
 -ship, & he is here represented making that
 very discourse which *Scavola* heard him
 deliver. This way of writing, where Antient &
 Eminent men are as it were speaking to us,
 has a strange power upon our mind, & carrys

with it I know not how a greater weight &
 authority. so that I myself reading what I
 writ upon *Old Age*, have been so affec-
 = ted with it, that I have thought it was not
 I, but *Cato* was speaking. But as then I an
 old Man writ to an old Man concerning
Old Age, so now I the most friendly write
 to a friend concerning *Friendship*. Then
Cato spoke, to whom nobody could be preferred
 either in age, or wisdom: Now *Laelius* the
 Wise (for so he is call'd) yeacelling in the glo-
 = ry of friendship speaks about *Friend-*
ship. I desire that you would awhile turn
 your thoughts from me, & persuade yourselves
 that *Laelius* is speaking. *Gaius* *Fan-*
 = *nius*, & *Quintus* *Mucius* come to
 their father in law after the Death of *Af-*
ricanius: The Discourse arises from
 there & *Laelius* answers them. who as you

(6)

will perceive by reading of it takes to himself.
this whole Dissertation upon Friendship

Chapter 1.

Fannius, Scavola Lalius

Fannius.

What you have
been saying, Lalius, is undoubtedly true.
There never was a man of more exemplary
Virtue or of greater fame than Africa-
=nus. But you are to consider that you
are now the Man whom everyone esteems
galls the Wise. The Late Marcus
Cato had this Name given him. Un-
=der this Title was Lucius Atilius
distinguished: but both of them for diff-
=erent Reasons: Atilius had this title

given him from his judgment & skill
 in the Civil Law: Cato, for his experience
 in the world & knowledge of men: There
 are many things reported which he fore-
 saw with great prudence, or acted with
 steadiness, or acutely reply'd to both, in the
 Senate & in the Forum; This it was
 that in his old age gain'd him the Title of
 Cato & Wise. But your Character
 is built upon another foundation, you are
 call'd Wise not only from your superiour
 Genius & moral Endowments. but also for
 your Education in the Liberal Sciences
 & your Accomplishments in Learning:
 Nor are you stild Wise as the Com-
 = mon People understand that Term, but
 as the Learned apply it & it never was so
 justly apply'd to any of the Grecian
 Sages. For those seven to whom Tradition

has given that Title to some who have more nicely enquired into their Merits seem not to have deserved it. One indeed we have heard of who by the Oracle of Apollo was declared the Wisest among Men. This is that Character of Wisdom which is universally attributed to you, as to one who places all his happiness in himself, & thinks that true virtue is beyond the Reach of any human misfortunes. This General Opinion of you made many People enquire of me, & I believe of Scævola too, how you bore the Death of Scipio Africanus, & the more, because when we held our usual Conference upon the last Nones, in the Gardens of Decius Brutus, the Augur, you were not there, tho' no one used to be more punctual upon that Day & that Occasion.

Scævola. I must own, Lælius, that many

have made the inquiry mentioned by *Fannius*, & my answer was, that you bore the loss of so excellent a man & so intimate a friend with great moderation. Tho neither was it in your power, nor agreeable to your good nature not to be concerned. & acquainted them that it was an indisposition of body & not a defect of mind, that detained you from our last Collegiate Meeting.

Laelius. *Scilla*, you have done me justice, for I should not in regard to mine own advantage have withdrawn myself from that duty which I always attended when my health would give me leave. Nor do I think that any steady honest man would plead any casualty in life, as an excuse for omitting his Duty. As for the Character which you *Fannius*, have been pleas'd to give me, & which I by no means disown to myself I take it kindly as it comes from a friend. But in my Opinion you have not a right Notion of *Cato*. either there never was a man,

(which I am inclin'd most to think) or if ever there was one, he was the Man. For to pass over other things, how did he bear the Loss of his Son? I remember Paullus, I observed how Gallus bore his affliction: but theirs was only the loss of a Child: Cato's was the loss of one advanced in years & reputation. Wherefore, take care, how you prefer even him, whom Apollodorus judg'd to be the Wisest to Cato. for the former was celebrated for his sayings, the last for his Actions. To you, Young Gentlemen, I speak to you both I freely give this account of myself.

Chapter 2.

I should say that the Death of Sulpio did not affect me, with grief: this perhaps might meet with the Approbation of the Wise: but I am sure I should speak a great untruth. For I was heartily griev'd to lose such a friend, as I believe

never will be again: & I dare affirm, never was
 before. But I am not to seek for a remedy; I have
 it in mine own breast, & comfort myself chiefly
 with this thought, that I am free from that error,
 from whence sorrow for deceased friends is gene-
 -rally aggravated, for I am satisfied nothing ill
 could happen to *Scipio* from Death. but if any
 it was all mine, & to be extremely sorry for our
 own misfortunes, argues not the love of our friends,
 but of ourselves. Who can deny that *Scipio*
 enjoy'd a great share of happiness? Unless, he de-
 -sired immortality upon earth; (which he never
 thought of.) what had he not acquir'd, that's
 right for man to wish for? Since in his youth
 by his incredible virtue, he exceeded the utmost
 hopes, that his Countrymen had conceiv'd of
 him, while a child: & since he never stood for
 the *Consular Dignity*, yet was
 twice chosen *Consul*; the first time before

he was of a legal age for that employment:
 & a second time in a proper time for him, tho'
 almost too late for preserving the publick
 Safety: Since, by the utter destruction of cities,
 the most inveterate enemies to this Common-
 wealth; he put an end not only to all present
 but also to future Competitions: I shall, I speak
 of his easy & obliging behaviour: of his Duty to
 his mother: his liberality to his Sisters: his bene-
 ficence to his relations: & of his justice to all
 in general: these are things known to you;
 how dear he was to his fellow Citizens, was
 sufficiently shewn by the sorrows they express'd
 at his funeral. What could the Addition of
 a few more years have added to his happiness?
 for old age, tho' it may not be irksome, as I
 remember, Cato, the year before he dy'd, affirm'd
 in his discourse with me, & Scipio, yet it takes off
 that liveliness & vigour, which Scipio yet enjoy'd.

Wherefore his felicity & glory was such, that
 it was capable of no increase. But the sud-
 =deness of his Death took away the sense of dy-
 =ing, What kind of Disease carry'd him off
 it is hard to say, you know, what men generally
 suspected. But this I may truly say, that of all
 the happy & joyful Days that Scipio saw,
 that was the most glorious, when the Day before
 he dy'd, the Senate being dismiss'd, he was
 conducted home in the evening by the Senators
 and Allies of the Romans, & Latins:
 that from so high a Degree of Signity he might
 seem rather to have gone to the Gods above,
 than to y^e Shades below. For I do not in the
 least agree with them, who have maintain'd a new
 Doctrine, that the Souls of men do not survive
 the body, but that Death destroys both.

Chapter 3

The Authority of the antient Philosophers, as well as that of our own Ancestors, prevails more with me who instituted and religiously observed so many funeral rites and Ceremonies: which they would never have done, had they thought that no effect of these honours could reach the Dead: I have a regard too for the opinion of those Pythagorean Philosophers, who lived in that part of our country call'd, *Magna Græcia* (then in a flourishing condition, tho now almost ruin'd & destroy'd,) & first instructed us in Philosophy. I pay respect to his judgment, whom *Apollo* declar'd to be the Wisest of men: who did not as the Generality of people do first say one thing, & then another,

but was steady in this Doctrine, that the Souls
 of men were a divine Principle, & that when
 they left the Body, they reascended into Heaven,
 & that those especially of very good, & just men
 had a very expeditious passage thither. So Scipio
 thought: who indeed as if he had foreseen his
 Death, which happened a few Days after, in the
 presence of Philus, & Marullus, & many others,
 & of you, Scaevola, who was introduced by me,
 disputed for 3 Days concerning the Common-
 wealth: & closed the whole with a discourse
 concerning the Immortality of the Soul: which he had
 from Africanus in a Dream.

If this be so, that in the moment of
 Death the Souls of the best men fly away, as it
 were out of the chains & prison of the body; I believe
 no one ever found the Passage to Heaven easier,
 than Scipio did. And therefore, should we grieve
 at this event, that happened to him, we should disco-

ever more of envy than of Love. But if the
 Opinion of some other Philosophers seem
 true, that the Soul & Body perish together, &
 that no sense remains after death: Then as there
 is no good in Death, so certainly there can be
 no evil in it; for when our sense is lost, it is the
 same, as if we never had been born: Were the
 Kings & we ourselves & the whole city as long as it
 shall remain, will rejoice that *Scipio* had
 his being. Therefore I think as I have said before,
 that his Lot was very happy; but mine, very
 unfortunate; for as I entered first into Life, so
 ought I first to have departed. But yet, I so much
 enjoy the remembrance of our friendship, that
 I seem to have lived happy, because I lived with
Scipio: with whom I still acted both in publick
 & private affairs: At home, or in the Army we
 lived together; & (which is the Life & Soul of friend-
 ship) our Inclinations, our study, our opinions were

the same. Wherefore that Opinion, which Fannius tells me, the world has of my wisdom, especially since it is ill grounded, does not please me so much, as the hope, I have that the friendship I had with Scipio will forever stand upon Record; & this pleases me the more, because there are not above three or four Instances of such a friendship. & among these I hope, that of Scipio and Laelius will be known to posterity.

Fannius Undoubtedly, Laelius, it will be so: but, because we are now at leisure, if you will, as you are us'd to do upon other occasions when your opinion is ask'd, explain the Nature of friendship to us, in what it consists, how it is to be cultivated, & what directions you have to give us concerning it, you will oblige me mightily.

Scavola This will be very agreeable to me too. I was just going to propose it

when Tannius prevented me. Therefore I believe you will extremely oblige us both.

Chapter 4

I should not think it at all troublesome to undertake what you desire, if I thought myself equal to it: for it is a Noble subject: & we are as Tannius says at leisure. But who am I? or what Talents do I pretend to? This is the province of the learned, & of the Greeks alone, to be ready for a disputation upon any Subject, that is proposed. It is a great undertaking, & requires a long practice. Therefore, if you desire such a discourse, I must send you to those whose profession qualifies them for such a work. I can only advise you, to prefer Friendship to all other human blessings. For there is nothing more agreeable to

Future, nor of greater use both in Prosperity & Adversity. But first of all I think, there can be no Friendship, but between Good Men. Which expression I use not in that nice & strict sense, as some subtle Philosophers do, only perhaps, but not with much regard to the Common use of it in the world, for they deny, that any man can be good, unless he is wise. Be it so: but then they interpret that wisdom, to be such, as never any mortal man arriv'd to. We are content with such virtue, as is to be found in common life, not such, as we may wish for, or form an Idea of in our minds.

I cannot be said, that Caius Fabricius, Marcus Curius, Titus Coruncianus, which our Ancestors esteem'd wise men, were so according to their Notion of perfection. Wherefore,

Let them keep to themselves that invidious and
 obscure Character of Wisdom; if they will but
 allow that these were *Good Men*. I know
 they will not allow it; because they will deny
 that any one can be good unless he is *Wise*.
 Let us go on without any such nice distinctions,
 & let them who so live, & so behave themselves,
 that their truth, Integrity, Equity, & Liberality
 is unquestionable; Who are govern'd by no cov-
 -lous, immodest or ambitious Passions, who have
 that Constancy of mind, in which these whom
 I just now mention'd excel; Let such men as these
 I say, be call'd as they are, generally esteem'd *Good*
Men. Because (as far as men can) they follow
 Nature, the best guide to a good Life. For
 it seems to me, that we are all born, to have
 some society with others; & still a greater
 with those who by some Relation or other
 approach nearest to us. Therefore, those, of

our own Country, are preferable to foreign-
ers, & kindred, to strangers. for among these
Nature has laid some foundation of
Friendship: tho not such an one as may
prove firm & lasting. For in this Friend-
ship has the Advantage of Relation, that
the last of these may subsist without kind-
ness, but the other never can. For Kindness
once ceasing, Friendship is at an end, but
Relation still remains.

How great the force of Friend-
ship is, may from hence appear, that it
is something collected from the general so-
ciety of mankind, reestablish'd by Nature,
& contracted as it were into a narrow com-
pass, so that all Degrees of kindness are
united between two, or three, or at most
very few.

Chapter 5.

Friendship is a perfect harmony of sentiments, in all moral & religious duty's, join'd with entire affection & kindness; than which, amongst all the blessings that heaven has bestow'd upon us, I know none more valuable, (unless it be ^{2d} Wisdom). Some give the preference to Riches, others to Power; others to Honour, nay many to Pleasure. The last of these is brutal; the others perishable, & uncertain, plac'd not in our own Power, but in the Caprice of Fortune. Some make Vertue the chief good, and very laudably; But this very Vertue is the parent, & preserver of Friendship: nor can there be any real Friendship without it. But let us estimate Vertue according to the manner, that we see it practis'd in common Life, & as we use the word in

Common discourse: & not according to those magnificent descriptions the Stoicks give us of it. Let us, I say, esteem them Good Men; which have ever been so acknowledged; such as the *Pulli*, the *Cato's*, the *Galli*, the *Scipio's* & the *Phil's*. The world is content with such as these, & we have nothing to do with those, who are nowhere to be found but in the imagination of Philosophers. Among such men as these, & advantages which arise from Friendship, are inexproffible. For who can be said, as *Ennius* expresses it, to live a life worth living, that has no acquiescence in the kindness of a Friend? What can be more delightful, than to have one; with whom you may converse as freely, as with yourself? What would be the great Pleasure of prosperity, had we no one, who could equally share in ^{our} joy of our good fortune? & how much more difficult would it be for us to bear Adversity, without one who would

have even a greater concern for it, than we ourselves have. Other things, that are desirable, have almost each of them their tendency to some one particular end: Riches, that you may make use of them; Power, that you may create dependencies; Honours, that you may meet with applause; & Pleasures, that you may gratify your inclinations.

But Friendship takes in a larger compass: wherever you turn yourself, it is present to you; it is shut out of no place; is never unreasonable, never troublesome. Therefore, as the saying is, Fire, & Water are not of more universal use to Mankind, than Friendship. Nor do I speak now of that Friendship which is usual among those that are well acquainted, (tho' that too be not without its pleasure & advantage) but of that which is true, & perfect; & such as there was among those few examples, which I have mentioned. Such a Friendship gives a lustre to prosperity,

& softens our Adversity by dividing, & communicating our misfortunes.

Chapter 6.

Among the many, & great advantages which arise from Friendship, none is more considerable than this, that it always raises up our hopes, & never suffers our Spirits to languish; much less to sink. He who looks on his friend, looks as it were upon his own Image. Therefore in absence they are together; in poverty they abound; in sickness they are healthy, & what is more, when dead they still live whilst the memory, the honour, the desire of them is preserved by their survivors. From whence, the Death of the one seems happy; & the life of the other praise-worthy. If you take away the Cement of mutual Affection, all society, both civil, & domestick, must

+ Empedocles

be dissolv'd; nor could so much as the Villages
 of the Country subsist. If the advantage of
 Friendship & unanimity does not from
 hence sufficiently appear, we shall easily
 perceive it, from considering the effects of dis-
 cord, & dissention. For what Family is so well
 establish'd, what city so strong, that may not be
 utterly destroy'd by hatred, & quarrels from this alone
 you may judge, what consequence Friendship
 is among men. We have heard that a learned man
 of *Elgrigentum*, who writ Philosophy in verse,
 declar'd that the whole System of the world, & all
 things that move in Nature, were kept together
 in this constant order by agreement, & would be
 all in confusion by Discord. & this ~~indeed~~ ^{is} what
 all men understand & own to be true in fact.
 Therefore whoever has at any time distinguished
 himself either in offering himself to dangers for his
 friends, or sharing dangers with him, who is there that

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has not highly commended him, & so the
Theatre ring with applause when the Tragedy
of *Marius Pacurius* first appeared,
in which the King being ignorant, which of
the two Strangers that were brought before him
was *Orestes*, *Pylades*, said he was the man,
& shew'd an earnest desire to be executed instead
of his Friend: & at the same time *Orestes* (as
the truth was) vehemently persisted that he was
the person enquir'd after. They stood up to ap-
plaud this in a fabulous Representation: what
would they have then said if the fact had been
Real? Nature broke out & shew'd itself upon this
occasion: when men, rightly judg'd what was well
done in another, tho perhaps they had not courage
to do it themselves.

Thus far I have been able to declare to
you, my sentiments of Friendship, if you require
more, (as much more is to be said) I must send you

to those, whose profession qualifies them to discourse more fully upon these matters.

Fannius Sir, if you please we had rather have it from you: tho I have enquired of those you direct us to & heard them, with a great deal of pleasure; but we desire to hear this Argument continued by you, not that of it after a new different manner.

Scavola What then would you have said, Fannius, had you been present in Scipio's gardens, when he discoursed concerning the Common wealth; How did he plead the cause of justice against the study'd & artificial Orations of Philus!

Fannius That indeed was easy for so just a man, to defend Justice.

Scavola Therefore is it not as easy for him who has gain'd the greatest Reputation, for steadily & religiously discharging all the Duties of Friendship,

to explain to us his thoughts upon that Argument.

Chapter 7

Lalius

This is indeed putting a force upon me, but it matters not which way you prevail; either by commendation; or Intreaty; for prevailed you have, nor is it easy or reasonable, to deny the request of one car a Relation; & especially upon so good an occasion. To proceed therefore in my thoughts upon this subject; I have often considered whether Friendship was sought by us upon the account of our weakness, or want; that we might give & return mutual kindness & assistance to one another; or whether there are only the consequences of it, & the thing itself arose from some more noble & honourable cause founded in human Nature; & indeed Love is the first and Principle motive that engages men in Friendship. For we reap advantages from those, to whom we make

our courts, & pay our devoirs with this design
and without any real Respect: But in a Friendship
there is nothing feigned, nothing pretended, 'tis all
sincere, & voluntary. We therefore it seems to me that
Friendship proceeds rather from Nature, than
from any sense of want, & rises from some similar
Inclination that Friends perceive in one another,
than from any consideration of Interest: something
of this kind we may observe, even among brutes:
who for a certain time shew a strange affection for
their young & have such returns of affection from them,
which may easily be discerned. This is still more
evident in mankind. First from that affection
that is seen between children & Parents, which can
never be dissolved without the Imputation of an
horrid crime. Secondly here a mutual sense of love
arises, between two that meet together, whose man-
ners & natures are such, so that they seem to be struck
as it were with a light, that shines forth from each other's

Probity & Vertue. For nothing is more amiable, and
 attracting than Vertue; which we regard, and even
 love, in the Character of those we never saw. For
 who that hears or reads the Actions of Fabrice
 -us, & Curius can forbear pursuing their memory
 with kindness, as well as admiration? Who again
 can hear the History of Tarquinius, Proud,
 Cassius, or Malius, without detesting their per-
 sons, as well as their Characters? There were two
 Generals, Pyrrhus, & Hannibal, who dis-
 -puted with us the Sovereignty of Italy, of the
 former, because of his honour & Integrity, we can
 think favourably & without aversion; the latter,
 because of his cruelties, we can never look back
 upon without the utmost abhorrence.

Chapter 8.

For if such be the force of Vertue, that we

must love it even in those, we never saw,
 nay, which is more, in an enemy: what won-
 der is it, that the minds of men are sensibly
 affected, when they perceive virtue & goodness
 in those, with whom they are used to converse?
 Though Kindness is improv'd, by an intention
 of good offices, by frequent conversation, and by
 evidently perceiving a desire of obliging. I sh^d
 say from this experience the first motives of
 our mind towards Love, & affection are much
 increased, & raised to the most exalted degree
 of Friendship: which if any one derives
 only from a Principle of gaining what we
 desire, he leaves nothing generous in it, and
 traces it from a very mean Original. were
 it so, the more a man thought he wanted,
 the better qualified would he be to engage in
 Friendship. which is far otherwise for
 the more a man confides in himself, & more

vertue, & wisdom he has to support himself without the Assistance of others, & makes his happiness consist in those things which are within his own power: the more he generally exceeds others in a desire of contracting, & cultivating Friendships.

Had Africanus any want of one or one in the least. Nor indeed had I any of him: but I was struck with an admiration of his vertue, & he, perhaps having some opinion of my Integrity, lov'd me; and our kindness was improved by longer acquaintance. And tho' from hence many, and great advantages accrued to both of us, yet the beginning of our Friendship did not in the least arise from any such hopes. For as we are liberal, & generous, not that we may exact returns of gratitude (For we do not put our good offices to Interest) but our natural Inclination leads us

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to Liberality: So we acquire Friend-
-ship, not with any view of advantage,
but because that very Love with which we
feel our minds affected is the most delightful
fruit that *Friendship* can yield us.

These Notions are very different
from theirs, who like Brutes place all their happi-
-ness in pleasure, for they who have degraded
their reason, & made it stoop to such mean, &
contemptible Gratifications, can never relish,
or aim at any thing that is truly noble, sub-
lime, & heavenly. Wherefore let us have nothing
to do with such voluptuaries in this discourse:
It is enough that we ourselves can apprehend
that we have a Natural sense of kindness,
& affection, arising from the appearance of
Fidelity. Where these are discern'd, we make
a closer application, & advance nearer to one
another, that we may enjoy the conversation

and soon qualities of him, whom we have be-
 - come to like; that we may be upon the same
 foot of kindness & respect, still more inclin'd
 & ready to do favours or services than to receive
 them. Let this be the honourable strife between
 Friends, and this will be a proof that Friend-
 ship is not only attended with the greatest
 advantages, but that it has its rise from Na-
 ture, & is founded upon a truer & surer Principle
 than can possibly proceed from human weak-
 ness. For if Interest alone was the cement of
 Friendships, as that changes it must of
 course dissolve them: But as Nature is unchan-
 - geable, & always the same, so true Friendship
 is constant & perpetual. This I take to be the
 Origin of Friendships, & have done un-
 less you desire me to proceed further.

Fannius By all means, Lælius, go
 on, for I think I have a right to answer for my

Junior Scævola.

Scævola. Right Sir: therefore let us hear it.

Chapter 9.

Laelius Hear then if you please, my Worthy Friends, what has often pass'd between me, and Scipio in our discourse about Friendship. tho' he us'd to say, that nothing in life carry'd a greater appearance of difficulty in it, than the preserving Friendship entire to the end of Life. because, it must often happen, that the same things may not be expedient to both, or that they may differ in their opinion concerning publick affairs: besides that, ^{change} in manners & temper of men, either by misfortunes or old age, & he shew'd us by familiar Instances, how easily

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in Life this inconstancy of humour discovered
itself: so that the greatest fondness between
children is often dropt when they are boys: nay
if they carry it on till they are farther advanced
in life, & grow up to be youths, it is often broke
off when they become rivals on account of the
same mistress, or if farther still: it is very often
lost if they come to be competitors for the same
preferment. For there is nothing more destructive
of Friendship, than what we see in most
men an immoderate desire of wealth, & what
we see in the best men Ambition, & thirst af-
ter glory: from whence the greatest animosities
have arisen between the dearest Friends, of-
ten too great dissensions have arose, & indeed
upon just grounds, when something has been re-
quired of a Friend, which was not honour-
able: as to be a witness in a Court, or in just action:
which if he refuses, (tho he does it very honestly)
yet by those who require his compliance, he will

be traduced as one that has violated the laws of Friendship: but they, who dare upon such an account demand the assistance of a Friend, profess that very demand, that they would stick at nothing to oblige a Friend: Such Complaints as these must not only destroy the most established Friendship, but also produce the most lasting & mortal hatred. Scipio considering these, & many more fatal accidents, that might happen in Friendship, said, that to avoid all of them, a man must have a very extraordinary share not only of wisdom, but of good fortune too.

Chapter 10.

Wherefore first let us see, if you please, how far our regard to Friendship ought to carry us. supposing Coriolanus to

have had Friends, were they oblig'd to
 assist him in bearing arms against his
 Country? Ugh! *Viscellinus* or *Spurius*
Malius, to have expected the help of their
 Friends in their ambitious designs of usurpa-
 tion & Tyranny? We saw indeed *Tiberius*
Gracchus, when he rais'd disorder in the
 Common-wealth, deserv'd his grave.
Quintus Tubero, & the rest of his friends
 of that sort. *Caius Blossius* of *Cuma*,
 well acquainted in your family, *Scaevola*, whom
 I was in council with *Laelatus* and
Rupilius the Consuls, came to me, and
 desired me to interceed for his pardon, offering
 this excuse for himself; that he had soon at a
 regard for *Tiberius Gracchus*, as to think
 anything fit to be done that he desired. How
 says he? what if he had bid you set fire to the
Capitol? No man would have desired.

that: But what if he had? I could have obey'd him. What a profligate saying was this? yet the man did this, nay more: for he not only joyned in the rash enterprises of *Gracchus*, but was forward in them: not a follower only, but a leader in that sedition: Wherefore terrified at the inquisition that was made upon that affair, he madly fled into *Asia*; took refuge with a foreign enemy; but at last suffered the severe & just punishment; due to his crimes against *Com-mon-wealth*. It is no excuse therefore for an ill action, to say you did it upon the account of your Friend. For since the opinion that one man has of another's virtue, has been laid down as the foundation of all Friendship; if Virtue once fails Friendship can hardly remain long. But if we lay this down for a right maxim, that we ought to comply

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with the desire of our Friends, in everything,
to equal the same compliance from them:
This rule can never hold but between those who
are perfectly just & good. Of such as these we are
not now speaking but of such as we converse with,
or such as we have heard of or seen in Common
Life. But of this Number our examples are to
be took, & chiefly from those who come nearest
to perfect Wisdom. We have heard that *Papirius*
Amilius and *Gaius Lucinius* were great
Friends, (so we have it from our *Quintus*) that
they were *trine Consuls* together, and *Amice*
Colleagues in the *Censorship*. It is said too,
that *Marcus Curius* & *Titus Coruncianus*
were very intimate Friends with them, & with
one another. And we cannot so much as sus-
pect; that any one of these could be capable
of importuning a Friend; to engage in anything,
against Honour, against an oath, or against the

publick good. But if we could suppose any one of them to have made such a request, it could not have been comply'd with by any of the rest, who were men of great Integrity; For the Compliance would have been altogether as scandalous, as the request.

Chapter 11

Let this then be an established law in Friendship, that we never require base actions of our Friends, nor comply with them when they are required of us, for it is a pitiful Plea, & never to be accepted in excuse for any crime, especially for a crime against the Commonwealth, to say you did it for the sake of your Friend. For we are plac'd, O Fannius, & Scavola, in such a station, that we ought

to look forward into the future state of the Commonwealth. Though it must be owned that in this regard, we have deviated from that course, which was marked out to us by our ancestors. *Tiberius Gracchus* endeavoured to seize the Government, and indeed he reigned a few months. Nor was ever such an attempt before seen, or heard of among the Roman People. His Friends & Relations after his death pursued the same measures, I cannot without tears relate, how they used *Scipio Nasica*.

We bore indeed with the insolence of *Carbo*, because of the punishment that was so lately inflicted upon *Tiberius Gracchus*. What we are to expect from the present Tribuneship of *Caius Gracchus*, I will not so much as guess. When the Spirit of Faction grows, now it has once appeared, it goes on more violently, to the ruin of the Commonwealth.

How, what has been the con-
 sequence of that Law, which the People
 have been allowed to give their votes privately
 when as first brought up by Catilius, some
 years after, in the year 1811, Mr.
 thinks I already see the People separated
 from the multitude: & the greatest affairs
 decided by the opinion of the multitude.
 more men will learn, how to follow their ex-
 -amples, than to resist them. Why do I
 upon publick matters in such a discourse?
 is this? because no one would enter into such
 attempts without a prospect of being assisted
 by Friends & acquaintance. Therefore, good
 men must be warned, that if they un-
 -warily fall into such acquaintance, they
 ought not to think themselves under such
 obligations to a Friend, as not to leave him,
 when they find him engaged in pernicious

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designs against the Common-wealth: he
Laws appoint severe punishments for such
ungrate men, for a less to those, who follow,
than to those who are the Leaders of sedition.

Who was ever more famous in
Greece than Themistocles: who more
Powerful. This great man, after he had been
General in the Persian War, and de-
livered Greece from Slavery, was driven
into Banishment by those who envied his glory,
and could not bear this Disgrace, & ungrate-
ful treatment from his country, with that im-
per he ought to have done. He did the same,
which our Coriolanus did: about ten or
twelve years ago, they found that no one would as-
sist them against their Country, and there-
fore they laid violent hands upon themselves.

Wherefore all Combinations of
wicked men, are not only not to be excused,

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under the pretensions of Friendship
but to be punished severely; that no one
should think it justifiable to follow even
his nearest Friend in a conspiracy against his
Country, which case, according to the present
appearances of things, may sometime or other
happen. And I am as sollicitous for the future
state of the Commonwealth after my Death
as for the present state of it in mine own days.

Chapter 12

Let this Law therefore of
Friendship stand good; that we are
to ask nothing but what is honourable of our
Friends, nor do any thing contrary to that for
the sake of our Friends: nor let us rail, till
we are asked; and so far from demurring, as to

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... is usually pleased with the company of
of it is: Let us be careful to be in
going to it. This ought to be an example to
more Friends: and if the matter requires
it, do this not only freely, but sweetly. Some who
are called wise men amongst themselves,
please themselves with some strange PAR-
ADOXES, and what is it, that they will not
prove by their subtle way of reasoning; such as
this, that too intimate Friendships
are to be avoided; For why should one man
be solicitous for many? It is enough, a man
has enough to do to look after his
own affairs: It is troublesome to be involved
in the concerns of others: That it is convenient
to let the Ruins of Friendships hang
loose: That you may mend them tight, or let them
quite go as you please. For inward tranquillity
is the main source of all happiness in Life;

which the mind can never enjoy, if one is to
 be in pain for many. There are others among
 these wise men (whose Principles I have touched
 upon already) who have still less humanity, &
 say that Friendships are to be sought, for our
 own safety, & Assistance, not out of any good
 will, with the hope that they who have less
 ability, and strength, of their own, are the best
 qualified to make Friendships. Hence it
 is, that Men want the support of Friend-
 ship, more than Women; the Poor, more than
 the Rich; and the Calamitous, more than the
 Fortunate. Excellent Philosophy indeed! It
 is taking the Sun out of the world, thus to take
 Friendship out of human Life: than which
 the Immortal Gods have given us nothing better,
 or more agreeable. For what is that boasted
 Tranquility of mind? indeed it has a fair app-
 earance, But in reality it is upon many occa-

(J.L.)

- vious is to be rejected with indignation & con-
- sider'd reasonable; not to undertake; or to lay
aside any honourable Design, or action, east it
should give you trouble. For if you are resolv'd
to quit all trouble, you must quit virtue too:
For every well dispos'd Mind may be under
some concern, in how it hates rather than loves
that is contrary to its own values; The good Man
must be great at malice, the Temperate at Sobri-
ety, the valiant at Cowardise, the generous at
injustice, the Modest at Envy.

It is the Nature therefore of a well
dispos'd mind to be pleas'd with that that is good;
& mend at the contrary. Now if any man takes
hold of a Vice that is so much certain, does
justly re-appeal him disesteem'd of all his
- man's. What reason is there, we have should
exclude all Friendship out of Human
Life; since it should engage us in any to converse

niceness or difficulties of the Affections of their
 more unbroken arrangement. If some would
 therefore say, or think that a Society at once
 women than a law, or a rule, or anything else
 that directs, is more the Power to believe, that
 is, that Virtue was a form of power, with no
 impression can be made, unless it is in an
 thing, but essential in Friendship, then let
 it act like a stone. Now we are at the
 point of rejected at the Liberty of the mind.
 Therefore that the occasion of this is not
 metimes to wonder for a short, not of that in mind,
 as that Friendship should be up on that account
 be discarded from Society any more than that all
 to be should be laid aside because it sometimes
 is a source of trouble & difficulties.

Chapter 13

But whereas I said before, an appearance

of vertue shines out, to which a mind of like
 Disposition applies, & joins itself, there Friendship
 is naturally contracted; And when that happens,
 Love & Affection must necessarily arise from it.
 For what is so absurd, as to be delighted with
 many vain things, such as Honour, Fame, fine
 houses, & ornaments of the Body, & not to be extremely
 taken with the amiable accomplishments of a
 virtuous mind, & expressing an inclination towards
 long desiring returns of the same kind from you?

For there is nothing more delightful,
 than to requite good will, & exchange good offices.
 And if we add that, which I think may not be
 added, there is nothing that excites, or attracts
 Friendship so much, as a similitude of
 manners; Let this be granted to be true, that
 Good People love those who are good, & adhere
 to them more closely than if they were joined to them
 by Nature, & Consanguinity.

Therefore, *P. Tannius, Scitica*,
 (I think) this holds good that there is but one
 method of forming a Friendship between good
 men: in which is the Original of Friendship
 not tuted by Nature, but the same Principle
 of Love, that directs itself to great Numbers. For
 Virtue is not reasonable, selfish, or partial: but
 is ever disposed to universal kind offices, to consulting
 the common good of mankind: which that man would
 do, if he wanted a reward even to the lower degrees
 of men. Therefore, the Friendship, all Friendship
 to arise merely from Interest, seem to me to take
 away the most valuable Part of Friendship.
 For when we are the better for a Friend,
 the advantage we gain by him does not please
 us so much, as his Kindness does: and the reason is,
 what comes from a Friend, is delightful, when
 we perceive it comes from a kind & generous

towards us, & is so far from being true; that
 Friendships are cultivated more out
 of want, than they are out of abundance,
 & most excel in vertue, & consequently the
 least want of other mens services, are often the most
 liberal & generous mercede, & reward, any
 reason after all why it may be not fit, or perhaps
 necessary in Friendship, that Friends should want
 the mutual assistance of each other. For to what
 purpose had my studies & Industry been employ'd,
 if Iupio had never had any occasion for my ad-
 vantage, either at home or abroad, or abroad
 in the war? Therefore Friendships do not
 arise from advantages, but rather advantages from
 Friendship.

Chapter 14

Therefore these men of Pleasure are

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not to be regarded; when they discourse upon their
- old life, which they know nothing of either by
reason, or experience. & who do not that's good
& venerable. In old, desire to see them in plenty, &
most the greatest luxury of life, without loving
any one, or being beloved. This is the life that wants
happiness which there is not but no affection, no corre-
spondence in any mutual kindness. There is nothing but
suits, & suspicions, no ground for friendship, for
no one loves him, whom he fears: or him whom he
thinks himself to be feared for a while a dissem'd
respect is paid to them: but if they should fall, (as
generally they do) then they are sure to find out how
few real friends there are, & is reported that a
queen said after his being deposed, that till
then he never knew, which were his sincere friends,
& which not, when he could no longer reserve the
one or the other: that is no wonder, that with a tyrannical
gift that mind he never could have had any, but

as the ill qualities of this man. I imagine
 could never procure any sincere Friends, so
 the wealth of many powerful men, must exclude
 true friendships. For Fortune is not only
 blind herself, but makes her favorites blind also,
 for which reason they are puffed up with arrogance
 & pride. For as much as we are sensible of
 the weakness of our nature, & the vanity of our
 pursuits, we are not so much inclined to
 be acquainted with those who are so much
 acquainted with us, & in fact, forgetting their
 own acquaintance, & in fact, forgetting their

But what can be more foolish, than for
 men who abound in Plenty, Power, & Riches, to be eager
 in furnishing themselves with things, that money can supply,
 as the use of fine cloathing, &c. in the mean
 time to neglect procuring Friends, the best & most
 ornamental furniture of life, so when they get
 all these things, they are left alone, & for
 want of friends, they are left alone, & for
 want of friends, they are left alone, & for

the strongest: But I will not allow, or
 admit: That, I allow things which are
 I cannot withhold from you, for I am
 I can never be pleased, I am not. But I will
 I will

Chapter 15

Now we are to determine, how
 far the Bounds of Friendship reach: concerning
 which I find three Opinions; tho I do not approve
 any one of them: The first is, that we should
 have the same love for our Friends, that we
 have for ourselves: Another is, that our Love to our
 Friends should exactly answer their Love of us:
 The third, that we should value our Friends at
 the same rate, that they value themselves. I cannot
 wholly agree with any one of these 3 positions. Nor
 is the first of them true, that a Man should love

his Friend in the same degree, that he loves himself. For how many things, which a man would never upon his own account, does he for the sake of his Friends? as to ask a favour of one, for whom he has no esteem, & even to solicit him: to inveigh against one that injures a Friend, with warmth & vehemence: which he cannot honourably do in his own cause, but may very honourable in the cause of a Friend. Nay there are many things, in which we decline our own advantage, in order to serve our Friends. The second position is, that which limits the Duty of Friendship to an equality of good Offices. This is too little, & mean; to make as it were a calculation of good offices, & too nicely ballance the account of Debtor, & Creditor. There seems to me, to be something more generous & overflowing in true Friendship, than strictly to observe,

that we give no more, than we receive. Nor
 need we fear, least anything should fall to
 the ground, & be lost, or least we should heap
 too much kindness upon a Friend. But the last
 Determination is the worst of the three, that
 a man should require to be valued by his
 Friend, in the same degree that he values him-
 self. For some people may be too humble, & have
 a meaner opinion of themselves, than they deserve,
 & upon this account may entertain no hopes of
 advancing their Fortune. A Friend therefore
 ought ^{not} to look upon such an one in the same light,
 that he looks upon himself, but rather to stir him
 up, to raise his spirits, & inspire him with greater
 hopes & better thoughts of himself.

Therefore I shall determine the
 Bounds of Friendship in another manner, after
 I have told you an opinion, against which Scipio

was wont vehemently to inveigh: For he often
 said that nothing could be insinuated more oppo-
 site to the Nature of true Friendship,
 than the reserve of him, who laid down this rule,
 To be your Friend, as if a Time might come
 when you are to hate him: The good Man could
 not bring himself to think, that this was, as it was said,
 to be, a position of the wise Blaise of the seven,
 but rather some profligate & ambitious wretch, who
 had nothing in view but his own Interest & Power:
 nor how can a Man be a Friend to any one, to
 whom he thinks he can ever possibly be an Enemy?
 Were this the Case we should desire, & wish, that
 a Friend might often be in fault, to the End that
 we might the oftner have an occasion to find
 fault with him: & we should be moved with
 Joy & merriment, at every good Action of a Friend, &
 all the success that happened to him: & therefore

this Rule, whatsoever it be, is destructive of all Friendship. The Rule to have been laid down might rather be this, that we should use that Care & Caution in the Choice of our Friends, that we should never begin to love one, whom we could not think it possible to hate. Moreover, if we should be unfortunate in choosing Friends, Scipio thought it was better to bear with this, than to think of a time when some breach might happen.

Chapter 16.

Therefore I think we ought to determine thus, that, when Friends are in the main satisfied of one another's Honour, & Integrity, then there should be between them

an entire Communication of Councils, of
 Designs & of every thing else: & if ever it
 should so happen, that they desire your
 Assistance in a case, that cannot perfectly
 be justified, where their Life, or Reputation
 are concerned, provided you do nothing that
 is base, & unjust, you ought not to decline
 serving them. For Allowance will be made for
 Friendship, as far as you can preserve your
 own Reputation. But to return to Scipio,
 (to whom all this Discourse upon Friend-
 ship is owing) he often complain'd, that men
 were generally more diligent in other affairs;
 that every one, could tell, how many goats, or
 Sheep he had: but not how many Friends.
 that they take great Care in providing those
 things, but are negligent in the Choice of their
 Friends: and that they are not so inquisitive
 after those marks & signs by which they may

distinguish them, who are fit for Friendship. We ought to choose such as are firmly established in Virtue, & good Principles: if not, it must be err'd, there is great Scarcity: and if not, we have not a great deal of experience, it is hard to make a right Judgment: yet we must learn our experience in Friendship itself. To Friendship has the start of our Judgment, & experience is not experience. Therefore a prudent Man will keep a tight rein upon his Inclination to Benevolence: & try before he goes too far the temper of his Friends, and will use them as he uses horses, that he has try'd.

Some, in a little affair of money are found to be wavering: some, who comply in a little matter, discover themselves in a greater. But if there be any found, who think it mean to value Money above Friendship, where shall we find those, who will not prefer

Courts, Magistracy, Commands & Power
 will: so that if these are proposed, on one
 side, & the neglect of Friendships on the other,
 their choice would not soon be determined.
 Ambition is very weak in resisting great
 temptations of power: which if they can arrive at
 by a breach of Friendship, they think the
 Importance of the Cause, for which for which
 they did it, will sufficiently atone them. There-
 fore true Friendships are seldom to be found
 among those who are pursuing the honours
 and Employments of the Commonwealth.
 for here will you find the man who prefers
 his Friends advancement to his own. But to
 omit these, how grievous, how hazardous, how
 seem to most men, to take their shares in
 calamities of their Friends. Dr. Williams rightly
 observes: that a true Friend is seen in trouble.

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Circumstances: yet up on these two accounts the Levity and Infirmity of most men may be discerned: either that in their own prosperity they esteem a Friend, or leave him in his Adversity.

Chapter 17

Whosoever therefore in both these Circumstances remains constant and steady in Friendship, we ought to think him above the common rank of mankind, and approaching to the Divine Nature. The Foundation of that Firmness & Constancy which we look for in Friendship, is Faithfulness. For nothing can be steadfast, that is faithless. Besides it is necessary to have one of a simple, ingenuous, & benevolent temper, and one that has Inclinations

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suitable to our own; which all contribute to
Fidelity. For a various & feeble Disposition,
is inconsistent with Fidelity: nor can he, who is
not affected with the same things, that we are,
and does not agree with you in the same mutual
Sentiments, be either faithful, or steady. We
may add this, that he should not be apt to mis-
suspicious Reflections, nor to believe them when
raised by others: which all belongs to the thing, I have
just now been speaking of. Constantly I say, that
Faction, which I laid down at first, must be true;
that Friendship cannot subsist, but between
Good Men.

It is the part of a good man
(and I may say of a wise man) to observe these two
things in French Friendship: first, that he does
nothing that carries with it either Falshood, or
Disimulation: for it is more ingenuous openly
to declare Hatred, than to pretend Love: And

Men ought not only to reject all insinuations of others against his Friend; but to be free from all suspicion of imagining and revelation of faults. To this we may add an agreeableness of temper & Conversation, which gives no little relish to Friendship. A seriousness & severity upon all occasions, may arise from a grave & honest disposition. But Friendship ought to be more open, free, and obliging, and more inclined to Laughter, & Complaisance.

Chapter 18

But here arises a question which some have thought difficult to resolve: whether or no new Friends, worthy of Friendship, should be preferred, as young horses are,

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to those who have been long in service; this is a
Fault unworthy of a good man; for there ought not
to be that satiation in Friendskip, which is usual
in other things. For other things (as well as wine) might
be liked the better upon the account of their being
old; for there is a great deal of truth in y^e Proverb,
that the Love between Friends is never well
confirmed, till they have eat many pecks of
salt together. New Acquaintances, if like thirina
Plants, they give us hopes of Fruit, are not to be dis-
regarded; But old Acquaintances must still
keep their first rank, for what we have been long
used to, has a natural force upon our minds. For
even in a horse, which I just before mentioned,
if there is no exception, there is none, but would
rather chuse one he has been used to, than one
that is new & untrod. This Use & Custom takes
place, not only in living, but in inanimate creatures.

as when we are delighted in places where we have spent much time, even tho' they happen to be wild, & mountainous.

But it is of the greatest moment in Friendship, that the Superiour should put himself upon a level with the Inferiour. for there often happens a great superiority, such as was that of Scipio among us (whom I may call) his herd of friends. he never thought himself above Titus, Publius, nor Nummius, or other Friends far below him in Quality or merit. especially to his Brother Maximus, a worthy man indeed, but by no means his equal, he paid a regard as to a superiour, upon account of his being the Elder; and he made it his endeavour that all his Friends should advance in their Character by his means. in example, that all ought to imitate; so that if one has arrived to a great age

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of understanding or virtue, or fortune, he should
share & communicate these advantages with his
Friends, who if they happen to be mean & low; if
they have no relations to assist them, he should by
his Power, & Fortune, increase their wealth; and
raise them in dignity & Honour: As we see in
fabulous history, that they who have lived some time
in mean & servile, have not known from what race
they sprung, when afterwards they are discovered, to be
the children of some Prince, or God, they still retain
their affections to those poor Shepherds, whom for so
many years they had taken to be their Parents, w^{ch}
ought much more to be kept up to our true, and
known Parents. For we then most enjoy the fruits
of good sense, and virtue, and advancement;
when we restore them upon those that are
dear to us.

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Chapter 19

As I have said that they who are
superiour in the Alliance of Friendship,
ought to put themselves upon a level with their
Inferiours; so Inferiours ought not to grieve, that
they are excell'd by their Friends, either in under-
standing, Fortune, or Dignity. It is not unusual
among the Common sort of People to complain
of, and even to upbraid one another: and especia-
lly if they think they can say, that at the expence
of some trouble and Labour to themselves,
they have done any kind of obliging services.
An odious sort of men these, who can upbraid
with their good offices, in which he indeed, to whom
they are done, ought ever gratefully to remember;
but he who does them should never mention.

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Therefore as the superiour should a little subrid himself; so he should endeavour to raise the inferiour, as near as he can to his own Level.

There are some People, who render Friendship troublesome, by thinking themselves neglected or despised: or which does ~~not~~ very often happen, but to them, who have mean thoughts of their own Abilities: and these we ought by our actions, as well as our discourse, to support, & raise up into a better opinion of themselves. As to the measure, in which you ought to distribute your kindnesses, you must consider, first, how much it is in your power to do for any one, and secondly how much the Character of him, whom you would assist, can bear: for you cannot, by your power never so great, advance all your Friends to the highest honours: Scipio was able to prefer Atilius to the Consulship, but not his brother C. CILIVS. But were it in your power

to conf. what we please upon another, you must
 still consider, what he can sustain. I pretend:
 He can make no right judgment of them, with
 whom we now deal, who enter into a thorough Friend-
 ship, till our understandings are ripen'd, and
 confirm'd by years; nor should we think ourselves
 oblig'd, to present an intimacy with those, whom we
 could not be we were young, because they were our
 companions in the same sports & exercises, with
 which we were then pleas'd. For at this rate our
 nurses, & first instructors will have the first claim
 to our Friendship: These indeed ~~cannot~~
 to be neglected, but our regards to them is to be
 shown in another way. Unless this rule is observ'd,
 there can be no such thing as a true & lasting
 Friendship, which can never consist with
 different Principles, manners, & Inclinations: And
 it is upon this account, that there can be no
 Friendship between good & ill men.

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It may not be improper to add this caution,
that we do not throw of our injection and in-
cisions Seal for our Friend (which has often
happened) for his success is that an advan-
tage we are so anxious to procure, for as
the Poetical Oracle says, *Neque loquimur, sed rever-*
tuntur & you, he had hearkened to *Uxor*.
All with whom he was bred, who with a
entreaty of tears, would have rendered him from
going on that expedition & here often happen-
affairs of Force or force, that call a man away
from a friend: and whose reverent times he
to stay, because he cannot bear the Absence of
his friend, shews himself to be often of great
a nature, and for that reason incapable of being
just in his Friendship, & it is to be considered
upon every occasion, what you require of your
friend, and what you will allow him to require
of you.

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Chapter 20.

There happens sometimes an
unfortunate, but unavoidable necessity, of breaking
off Friendship, & some an common Friend-
ship; not, such as Philosophers talk of, amongst wise
Men, whose manners admit of no change. The Vices
of men very often break out, sometimes even
against the very Friends, sometimes against their
in still a manner, that we cannot preserve an
intimacy with them, without scandal to ourselves. In
such a case, we must retreat from them by degrees,
and as I have heard Cato reject himself gently
unseen, & not abruptly rend our Alliance: Unless some
flagrant offence be given, so that we cannot consist-
ently with Virtue, & Honour, avoid an immediate breach.

But if some extraordinary change

happens (as sometimes it does) in their inanimateness
 suppositions, or in the different Interests the state
 in late affairs, Parties we must take care that when
 we drop our Friendship we do not appear to act
 with Enmity against them for nothing is more unbecom-
 ing than to be in a state of war against one with
 whom you have lived familiarly. *Scipio* (as you
 well know) withdrew himself from the Friend-
 ship of *Quintus Pompeius* upon my account
 so likewise he was alienated from that of my colleague
Metellus, because of the disagreement between
 them in matters relating to the commonwealth. In
 both these cases, he behaved himself with his usual
 gravity & authority, with a resentment, free from all
 Passion & Bitterness. In the first place then, we ought
 to prevent a Rupture (if it be possible) but if
 that be unavoidable, our Friendship must seem
 to expire gently & not be violently smother'd. We are
 to take care, that our Friendship be not turn'd into

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inveterate Hatred, from whence quarrels, wars, and Calumnies must arise, nevertheless if they are tolerable, we must learn to live with them, we must have this respect in old Friendships, be the fault his, who does this, or not his, who suffers it.

To prevent these mistakes, and Inconveniences, we should be forewarn'd with this Caution, not to enter into these engagements either too hastily, or with those of whom worth we are not fully satisfied, those alone are worthy of our Friendship, in whom we discern some intrinsic merit, that moves our Affection. Such as these are very scarce, (as all things of value are) nor is there anything more difficult, than to find out, what is every man's perfect in to kinds. But most Men know no other goods in any thing, but the advantage it may bring to themselves, choose Friends (as they do cattle) that are likely to be most serviceable to them, so that they want that noble and genuine sense of Friendship, which renders it

desirable upon its own account, and for its own sake alone; nor are they able to set before themselves their own example, which might teach them against Nature, & how great the Force of Friendship is. For even one loves himself, not for a weaker or an advantage he expects from such an affection; but more because he is dear to himself, and would not transfer this sort of Love to Friendship, we shall never find a true Friend, for that must be one, that is our other self.

If this appears in Beasts, Birds, & all other Creatures, either wild or tame, first that they love themselves (for that is equally natural to all animals) then that they require, and look after other animals of their own species, more than their desire, and application, than mankind does; how much more must the Nature of man, who loves himself, and wants a companion, look out for

one, with whom he may communicate all the thoughts of his soul; and with whom he may join himself almost in a personal union.

Chapter 21.

But we are generally so unreasonable, and so vain in sentiment, as to expect our Friends should be such as we ourselves are: not, and to desire the same from them, for which we take no care to make suitable Returns. Whereas we ought in the first place, to take care to render ourselves as good & perfect as possible, and then look out for another like ourselves. It is between such men as these, that the steady Friendship, we have before mentioned, must subsist. Men united by the same generous & disinterested disposition, who have subdued those Passions, to which others are slaves: such as

these will be always pleased with what is just &
 equitable, & serve one another to the almost infinite
 occasion, since neither would require from the
 other what is inconsistent with reason & honour. For
 will they not love and respect; but stand in awe of
 one another. Thus who banish this sort of reverence
 from their friends, take away the greatest ornament
 of the Mind. *Friendship* is a most pernicious error
 in those who think that *Friendship* gives a licence
 to all freedom & looseness whereas Nature designed
 it as an obstacle of Vice, not an encouragement of Vice;
 so that sociable & confederate virtues may arise to those
 rights to which solitary Virtue could never arise:
 among whom this confederacy, or has been, or shall be,
 there will be found the best & happiest state; that
 human nature can arrive at. This, I say, is a society
 in which all, that men can think desirable, may
 be enjoyed, Honour, Reputation, Power & pleasure of
 Mind in these, and these only, the Happiness of life

consoling since it appears that the chief & sovereign good
 of Man, if we aim at that, we must make it the our
 Study; without which neither the *True* *Ship*, nor any
 thing else truly desirable can be attained. And who ever
 neglects this & thinks he has Friends without it, will find
 himself greatly mistaken, when any misfortune happens
 to him, that obliges him to make a trial of them. There-
 fore (as I have often said) it concerns us to judge carefully
 before we love any one, not to love him first, and make
 judgment of him afterwards, for as in all other matters
 we are to be guided by reason, so in nothing more than in the Choice and
 preference of Friends. We shall pay for this preposterous
 way of acting, when we are thus engag'd, where good
 offices will not be answered, but some Offence arise,
 which will break off our Friendship in the middle
 of its Course.

Chapter 22.

For this Reason our

Diligence is a matter of the greatest Importance
 and yet the more inexcusable. Indeed the little
 advantage of time & little help, is what all
 men with one consent allow. But many ridiculous
 notions of virtue, & would have it thought to be
 something of Silence, & Contention. Many desire
 riches, & contented with a little, please themselves
 in a slender Diet, & a very moderate Competency
 of Honour, which so much inflames the Desires
 of Ambition; how many are there who despise
 to such a Degree, as to think nothing more empty
 or unprofitable. The same may be said of other things,
 as of some admire & pursue, and others esteem of
 as vain & out of the World. It is the same
 in men of both, they who apply themselves to study
 & learning, & they who please themselves in the Study
 of Knowledge & Learning; they who retire & make
 themselves up in their own private Affairs: Nay they
 who give themselves up entirely to Pleasure, and

man will own there can be no true enjoyment of
 Life, without Friendship. This Inclination to
 Friendship is so universal, that it insinuates
 itself into every state & every Age of Man. If any one is
 so much inhuman a temper, that he shuns
 all correspondence & conversation with man;
 and as one *Simon of Athens* is said to have done,
 yet he cannot forbear looking out somebody, in whose
 company he may give a vent to his spleen & Pique.

But we might easily be convinced
 if any such thing could happen, that some God should
 take us away from all human Society & place us in some
 solitude, where he supplies us in great abundance with
 all those things that our Natural Appetites require, but
 took away from us all possibility of human conversation.
 whose constitution could bear such a Life as this, or
 enjoy any other sensual Gratifications, under such a
 Restriction.

I am therefore, as that saying is, *utitur*
et Tarentum, often used, which I have heard
 related from old men, who had it from old men
 this time, that could do, or ascend into Heaven;
 and be acquainted with the Nature of the whole world,
 & the beauty of every star in the firmament; such a
 contemplation would be insipid to him were he
 alone, whereas had he any one to whom he might com-
 municate his thoughts, it would be most delightful.
 For Nature itself, all her solitude, and even part
 of it inclines to be supported, & to court the Alliance
 of another, & the more suitably & kindly that Alliance
 is the better every thing thrives.

Chapter 23.

But when the same Nature
 declares by many signs, what she wants, and requires,

yet we continue. I know not how deaf to her
 voice and will not hearken to any of her demo-
 nations. There are many advantages in Friend-
 ship, and there may arise some jealousies
 & distrusts, which a wise man will endeavour
 to avoid, or to slight, or if it must be, to
 bear. There is one thing which is apt to give
 offence, and yet neither sincerity nor faithfulness
 in Friendship can be preserved without it.
 I mean a Freedom of advising, for it is often
 our duty to admonish, & sometimes gently to
 reprove a Friend, & this ought to be taken,
 as it is meant, & very kindly, yet I must confess,
 that what my Friend Terence says in his
 Andria, is generally true:

“Complaisance gains Friendship,
 “& truth hatred.”

It is with some regret that

a man speaks Truth, when the Consequence
 of it must be repentment, which is the prison
 of Hell. Hell. Flattery is much
 worse, which being indulgent to our faults,
 lets your Friend run headlong into ruin. It
 is a very great Fault in him, who both dis-
 pises truth, & who is deceived by Flattery. We
 are to use Diligence, & Discretion in all things:
 first, that our advice be without sharpness,
 & our rebuke without reproach: Our fore-
 bearingness (for I will use Terence's
 word) must be obliging without flattery,
 which is the promoter of sin, and sorrow
 of a Friend; that it does not become a
 Gentleman. To live with a Tyrant, is far
 different from living with a Friend. We
 know, we are so shut to truth, that he
 will not hear it from a Friend, his recovery
 is desperate. It is a quaint saying of Cato's,

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as many of us are, that men are more
sollicitous for their sharpest enemies, than to
assist those that are always complaisant; for
these often speak truth, but these, never.
It is very absurd, that they, who are advised,
have none of that concern, they ought to
have upon such an occasion; but have only
that resentment, from which they ought
to be free, for they are not grieved for their fault,
but merely for the ^{reproach} Reproof: which ought to
be quite contrary, to grieve at the fault, but
rejoice at the Correction.

Chapter 24.

Therefore as it is the Duty
of True Friendship, to advise, & to be
advised: to do the first freely, but not

nothing is so common as to see
 a man who is a great deal of
 hat, there is not a greater pleasure in the
 world than to flatter. For this vice of
 light & deceitful men, & such as speak
 rather than to please, than
 things that are true, is a common man's
 love & flamed; since all Dissimulation is
 blameable (as it corrupts & adulterates truth)
 so it is utterly repugnant to Friendship.
 as it takes away all Sincerity, without
 which Friendship cannot subsist.
 For since the strength of Friendship
 is founded upon this, that two several
 minds as it were united in one person
 can this possibly be, when there is not in
 one of them so much as one of the same
 mind; but a mind uncertain, changeable,
 & various?

full of turns, as the mind of him who
is govern'd is not only in the opinion, & will
but even in the countenance & nod of another!

“ I often deny a thing & I might do
“ they affirm it. I affirm it too, I refuse it
“ have prevail'd with myself to comprehend
“ any thing;

* Terence

“ I have seen the same in the persons
of y^e naturalists. Paradox: to admit such
as these for friends, is more vanity. There
are indeed many y^e naturalists in the world,
of a superior rank, fortune, & reputation;
The Complaisance of these is very uneasy
to me, because it is mix'd with some Autho-
rity, from their character. For we may distin-
guish a complaisant from a true friend,
if we apply the same Litmus, that we
use to discover other counterfeited wares.

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An Audience, consisting of
very unskillful Persons, yet are able to judge,
what difference there is between a flattering,
trifling Orator, that affects popularity, and
who argues gravely, seriously, & in good earnest.
With what art & flattery did Cato's Pupillus
insinuate himself into the minds of
the Romans, when he brought in a Law for
continuing the Tribunes of the People? & was
against it. I say no more of myself: but may
be allowed to speak more at large of Scipio.
Good Gods! what Gravity, & what Majesty
was there in his Oration that Day! you must
have thought him not a Roman Citizen, but
a Governor among the Roman People. But
you were present, & the Oration is extant.
You saw how a very Popular Law was rejected
even by the vote of the very People themselves.
Do (to return to myself) you remember, when

in the Consulship of Quintus
 Maximus Scipio Brother, & Luc-
 ius Manlius, with what favour
 & applause the Law of Caius Licinius
 Crassus concerning the Popular Election
 of the Priesthood, was received. In which
 Law the Power of choosing was transferred from
 the sacerdotal Colleges to the People. And
 he was the first who in speaking before the
 People turned his back towards them, not
 towards the Senators. yet the Religion
 of the Immortal gods, by my poor defence
 of it, easily got the better of his mercenary
 oration, & that was done whilst he was Prae-
 tor five years before, he was made Consul.
 Therefore that cause prevailed, more
 by its own weight, & truth, than by any Autho-
 rity in him that defended it.

Chapter 25

But if in a Scene, when
 great design is all'd for false, & fiction,
 and truth, when it is discovered in the
 Calastrophe, exceedingly prevails & pleases
 us; What shall we say of it in Friend-
 ship, which is wholly founded upon
 truth in which unless you see another's
 Breast open, & freely open your own, you can
 find nothing to rely upon; you can neither
 love, nor be loved; where there is no mutual
 Perception of Sincerity, & that
 can hurt nobody, but him who receives it.

readily, & with Pleasure: it commonly
 happens, that his ears are mostly open
 to flatterers, who is apt to flatter & to admire
 himself. Virtue is a lover of itself: for it
 knows itself best, & understands how amiable
 it is. But I do not speak of Virtue itself,
 but the opinion of it. For not near so
 many people are really indew'd with Virtue,
 as are willing to be thought so. Flattery
 Delights these: in her, they are addressed
 to in a manner that pleases them, they
 imagine that empty applause, to be an
 ample testimony of their Praise. Therefore
 this can be no Friendship, where one
 will not endure to hear truth, & the other
 is always ready with false colours. Or
 would the Flattery of the Parasites in
 Comedies delight us, were it not for

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vain glorious Thraso's.

* "And does Thais indeed return ^{Terence's Eunuch}
me so great thanks?

It was enough for the Parasite to answer,
Great one's Sir: But he says,

"Exceeding Great Sir."

A Flatterer always increases that,
which he, to whom he speaks, would
have appear great. Wherefore, although
that vain flattery prevails with those,
who themselves entice, & invite it; yet
those of a more grave & steady mind
are to be advised, that they be upon
their guard, lest they be caught by a
skilful Flatterer. For nobody is moved
by an open flatterer, unless it be one who
is very insensible. But he that can do it

slyly, & dexterously, if we are not very
 cautious, will insinuate himself into
 our good liking, nor is he easily discovered:
 for when he seems to contradict us he may
 flatter us most: while he pretends to dis-
 pute, & at last yields up the Point, &
 suffers himself to be overcome in the
 Argument, so that he who is impos'd upon,
 may appear to be the more knowing. Now
 what is more shameful, than to be impos'd
 upon? To prevent which, there must
 be great care taken, as Callicles says
 in his Comedy call'd Epiclesus:

"To say thou hast choos'd & play'd upon
 "me, beyond all the foolish Old Men
 "that are represented in Comedy.

You see even in Plays that of a ^{credulous}

an unguarded old Man, is the most foolish Character that can be brought upon the Stage. But I know not how, my Discourse has wander'd from the perfect Friendships of Wise men, to those that are Common & Vulgar.

Chapter 26.

Let us return then to our proper Subject, & hasten to a Conclusion. Virtue, Caius Fannius & Quinctus Mucius, Virtue, I say, gains, & preserves Friendship. For in that there is an united harmony, in that alone there is

firmness & Constancy, which Excellencies,
 when they arise, & shew their Brightness and
 see their own Similitude in another Object,
 they move towards it & mix with it, & from hence
 that flame is kindled, which we call, Love,
 or Friendship: For to Love is to have an
 affection for another, not with any view to
 interest & advantage, though these too, even with-
 out ever being propos'd, arise out of Friend-
 ship. I, while I was yet young found these
 fruits of kindly Affection from Lucius
 Paulus, Marcus Cato, Caius Gallus,
 Publius Nasica, Giberius Gracchus,
 who was Scipio's Father in Law, & this shines
 out more among equals, as between me, and
 Scipio, Lucius Furius, Publius
 Rupilius & Spurius Mummius.
 On the other side, now I am an old man,
 I have a pleasure in your Love & Young Gentlemen,

(91)

in Quintus Tubero's; as I have also
that of Publius Rutilius & Aulus
Virginus, who are still younger than you.
And Because such is the Course of Nature,
& of human Life, that if we live many
years, we must see a new generation spring
up; It is, I own, most desirable, to live amongst
our Equals & to go on with those, together with
whom we first set out, even to the end of
our Race.

But as Human Affairs
change & fail, we must still look out, for
such, whom we may love, & by whom we may
be lov'd. For when once all mutual kindness,
& benevolence ceases, all the Pleasure of
Life is at an End.

My Friend Scipio indeed,

(98)

was suddenly snatcht from me, but he
still lives, & always will live in my heart:
for I lov'd the good man's virtues, which can
never dye; which are still present (as it were)
before mine eyes, & not before mine only,
but they will live & shine to all posterity.
No one will attempt any glorious Enterprise,
with hope or Courage without setting the
Image of that great man before his mind.

Among all those Blessings,
that Fortune or Nature had bestow'd upon
me, there is none, upon which I set so true a
value, as I do upon my Friendship with
Scipio. In this was founded all that unani-
mity with which we pursued the publick
Good, all that Freedom of consulting one
another upon our private Concerns, & all the
Ease & pleasure we enjoy'd in our Retirement.


For I never was sensible that I ever offend'd
 him in any thing, nor did I ever hear any
 thing from him, which I was unwilling to
 hear. We had one house, one table; we were
 together not only in the inn, but in our travels,
 & our rural Seats. What shall I say of our
 Studies & our Improvements in Knowledge, upon
 which, when we sometimes retired from the
 world we employ'd all our leisure time. If
 the memory of these things had been lost
 with him, I could never have been able
 to bear a Separation, from so dear, and
 Intimate, a Friend. But neither are they ex-
 tinct, but they are so far from being lost, that
 they are rather nourished, and increased by
 thought & Reflection: And were I deprived of
 these, the only comfort remaining to me, would
 be my old age, which would prevent any long
 continuance of my sorrow, & all short calamities

(500)

though very grievous ought to be tolerable.

This is what I had to say
upon Friendship; do you, young men, so
pursue Virtue, without which there can be
no Friendship, as to think that there is
nothing in Life, except Virtue, so valuable as
Friendship.

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
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
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
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
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






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